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ARTICLE
Fraud and First Amendment
Protections of False Speech: How United
States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional
Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws
LARISSA U. LIEBMANN

∗

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increasing number of state legislatures
have enacted laws aimed at preventing undercover investigators
from gaining access to, and disseminating information recorded
at, agricultural production facilities. Potential challenges to
these laws raise important First Amendment concerns. In the
2012 ruling of United States v. Alvarez,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States articulated that false speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection. That decision provides important insight
into the potential success of First Amendment challenges to the
Ag-Gag laws recently passed in various states. Whether the AgGag laws can be classified as restrictions on fraudulent speech is
integral to understanding whether a court would subject these
laws to the heightened First Amendment scrutiny outlined in
Alvarez.
Based on the framework set forth in Alvarez and principles of
common law fraud, the Ag-Gag laws would likely not be
considered restrictions on fraudulent speech, and, as contentbased restrictions on speech, would be subject to a heightened
level of First Amendment scrutiny. Further, based on the

Larissa U. Liebmann is a Legal Fellow at Potomac Riverkeeper and
graduated from American University’s Washington College of Law in 2013.
Many thanks to Bill Eubanks for his help and support on this article.
1. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
∗
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analysis set forth for heightened scrutiny in Alvarez, it seems
unlikely that the Ag-Gag laws would be found constitutional.
This article first explains the background and functions of
undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities,
and explains the bases upon which states pass laws intended to
prevent these investigations. It then gives a background of
research already conducted on the constitutionality of Ag-Gag
laws, and examines the relevance of the Supreme Court case
Alvarez. Based on the analysis provided in Alvarez, the article
demonstrates that Ag-Gag laws would not be exempt from
heightened First Amendment scrutiny as fraud statutes.
Moreover, it demonstrates that, in particular, the Iowa and Utah
Ag-Gag laws would not survive the heightened scrutiny outlined
in Alvarez.
ANALYSIS
I.

Undercover Investigations into Agricultural
Production Facilities

Animal protection groups utilize undercover investigations
into agricultural production facilities to uncover and publicize
abuses of animals such as cattle and chickens.2 Undercover
investigators most often gain access to these facilities by
obtaining employment at an agricultural production facility and
recording, or otherwise documenting, any abuse witnessed.3 By
acquiring footage of the conditions that exist in these facilities,
animal protection organizations hope to reveal illegal or
inhumane behavior, and gain public support for more humane
farming methods.4 These investigations have revealed major
2. See, e.g., Undercover Investigations: Exposing Animal Abuse, MERCY FOR
ANIMALS, http://www.mercyforanimals.org/investigations.aspx (last visited Mar.
16, 2014) (describing recent undercover investigations undertaken by Mercy for
Animals).
3. See, e.g., Rampant Cruelty at California Slaughterhouse, COMPASSION
OVER KILLING (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.cok.net/californiacows/ (“The video,
filmed by a [Compassion Over Killing] investigator who worked at the facility in
June and July 2012, documents egregious inhumane treatment, improper
slaughter methods, and intentional cruelty forced upon these animals in the last
moments of their lives . . . .”).
4. See, e.g., The Hidden Cost of Walmart’s Pork, MERCY FOR ANIMALS,
http://www.walmartcruelty.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (showing video
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violations of food safety and humane farming practices, and have
prompted action by both the United States Department of
Agriculture and by companies that purchase products from the
facilities investigated.5 This can cause economic and other
consequences for companies engaging in unlawful or inhumane
practices.6
II.

The Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag Laws

In March 2012, the legislatures of both Iowa and Utah
passed laws aimed at limiting the ability of groups and
individuals to perform these undercover investigations on
agribusiness.7 Because of the intent and effect of these laws, they
are classified as “Ag-Gag” laws. Ag-Gag laws can be defined as
laws intended to undermine the ability of groups to conduct longterm,
employment-based
undercover
investigations
at
agricultural production facilities.8
Obtaining employment at an agribusiness facility is often the
only way to gain access to the facility, since it is a privately
Therefore, a necessary aspect of these
owned enterprise.9
footage from a Mercy For Animals undercover investigation, revealing blatant
animal abuse at a Walmart pork supplier facility); see also Protect Animals
From Corporate Greed, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://protectyourfood.org/thelaw/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (“Under the guise of property rights, ag gag bills
are intended to prevent consumers from ever seeing the horrors of animal abuse,
contaminated crops, illegal working conditions, and risky food safety practices . .
. .”).
5. See, e.g., David Zahniser, Central Valley Slaughterhouse Reopens After
Animal Abuse Claims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, available at http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/08/central-valley-slaughterhousereopens.html.
6. See id.; see also, Matthew L. Wald, Meat Packer Admits Slaughter of Sick
Cows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/13/business/13meat.html?ref=westlandhallmarkmeatcompany&_r=0.
7. See, e.g., Dan Flynn, Utah Joins Iowa in Protecting Factory Farms From
Cameras, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.
com/2012/03/utah-joins-iowa-in-protecting-factory-farms-from-cameras/.
8. See, e.g., Sara Lacy, Comment, Hard to Watch: How Ag-Gag Laws
Demonstrate the Need for Federal Meat and Poultry Industry Whistleblower
Protections, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2013) (“These laws . . . focus instead
on deterring activists from working undercover to expose violations.”).
9. See Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses From
Public Scrutiny, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factory-farmabuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674/#.
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undercover investigations is that the investigators apply for
employment without revealing that their intention is to find,
record, and share evidence of animal abuse at the facility.10 In
response to this, a component of Iowa’s and Utah’s respective AgGag laws is that potential employees cannot make
misrepresentations upon applying for employment at an
agricultural production facility.11
The law in Iowa creates the crime of “agricultural production
facility fraud” where a person willfully
[m]akes a false statement or representation as part of an
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false,
and makes the statement with an intent to commit an act not
authorized by the owner of the agricultural production facility,
knowing that the act is not authorized.12

Based on this law, employers at agricultural production facilities
could include a question on their employment applications to the
effect of: “Do you seek employment at this facility for the purpose
of making unauthorized recordings?” If an applicant does not
answer truthfully, and has the intent of engaging in the
unauthorized activity, even without the actual act of doing the
unauthorized activity, then the person could face criminal
charges in Iowa.
The aim of the law in Utah is the same, though the
restrictions on employment are not as far-reaching. In Utah, a
person can be found guilty of “agricultural operation interference”
if the person: (1) “applies for employment at an agricultural
operation with the intent to record an image of, or sound from,
the agricultural operation”; (2) “knows, at the time that the
person accepts employment at the agricultural operation, that the
owner of the agricultural operation prohibits the employee from
recording an image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation”;

10. See id.; see also Undercover Activist Details Secret Filming of Animal
Abuse & Why “Ag-Gag” Laws May Force Him to Stop, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9,
2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/undercover_activist_details_
secret_filming_of.
11. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6112(2)(c) (West 2013).
12. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b).
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and (3) “while employed at, and while present on, the agricultural
operation, records an image of, or sound from, the agricultural
operation.”13 In contrast to Iowa’s Ag-Gag law, the Utah law
requires the unauthorized activity to take place in order for
criminal consequences to result.
In addition to creating harsh criminal sanctions, both the
Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag laws allow for agribusiness to recover
money damages from those convicted of breaching the laws.14
This could mean that a conviction under either law would allow
the agricultural production facility to obtain damages that result
from the dissemination of the information gathered from the
facility by the undercover investigator.15
III.

The Proliferation of Ag-Gag Laws and Concerns

In 1990 and 1991, Kansas,16 North Dakota,17 and Montana18
passed laws similar to those recently passed in Utah and Iowa.19
In 2013, Ag-Gag bills were proposed in eleven other states.20 Of
these, seven bills–in Wyoming,21 Indiana22, Arkansas,23

13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c).
14. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(1)
(West 2013).
15. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302.
16. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West 2013).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2013).
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (West 2013).
19. See Jessica Pitts, Note, “Ag-Gag” Legislation and Public Choice Theory:
Maintaining A Diffuse Public by Limiting Information, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95,
110 (2012) (giving an overview of Ag-Gag laws).
20. See Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses From the
Public, HUMANE SOC’Y (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/
campaigns/factory_farming/fact-sheets/ag_gag.html.
21. See generally H.R. 0126, 2013 Leg., 62d Sess. (Wyo.).
22. See generally S. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013). This bill
died in committee. See Harmful “Ag Gag” Bill Fails in Indiana—The Humane
Society of the United States Praises Legislature, HUMANE SOC’Y (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2012/03/harmful_ag_gag_bil
l_fails_031212.html.
23. See generally S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). Senate Bill 13 was delivered to the
Governor of Arkansas in April 2013, and enacted as Act 1160 in an amended
form lacking Ag-Gag provisions. See SB13 – Providing Legal Protection to
Animal Owners and Their Animals and to Ensure that Only Law Enforcement
Agencies Investigate Charges of Animal Cruelty, ARK. STATE LEG.,
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Pennsylvania,24 Vermont,25 North Carolina,26 and New Mexico27–
include the criminalization of misrepresentations on employment
applications. Most of these bills also have provisions that mirror
the Utah Ag-Gag law provision prohibiting recording and
dissemination of images or sounds collected at an agricultural
production facility.28 Other bills, including a law passed in
Missouri in 2012, take another form of Ag-Gag bills, which
establish reporting requirements related to recordings of animal
abuse at agricultural production facilities.29
Regardless of the form of the Ag-Gag bill or statute, the
proliferation of these types of legislation has led to concern among
a wide variety of advocacy groups, including those working on
civil liberties, public health, food safety, animal welfare,
environmental protection, and workers’ rights.30 This concern is
based on the fact that these laws have the effect of insulating the
activities within agricultural production facilities from the public

http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?
measureno=SB13 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
24. See generally H.B. 683, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.).
25. See generally S. 162, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt.).
26. See generally S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.).
27. See generally S. 552, 2013 Leg., 51st Sess. (N.M.).
28. See, e.g., S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C.), S. 552, 2013 Leg., 51st Sess. (N.M.), H.R. 683, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa.). But see S. 162, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt.).
29. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West 2014); A.B. 343, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal.). California Assembly Bill 343 died while in committee. Tracie Cone,
Undercover Animal Abuse Bill Killed Before California’s Assembly Agriculture
Committee Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/04/17/undercover-animal-abuse-bill-jim-patterson_n_3103521.html.
See also L.B. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); H.R. 110, 2013 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.H.); .); H.B. 1191, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); S. 1248, 108th
Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013). Tennessee House Bill 1191 and its companion
Senate Bill 1248 were passed by the House and the Senate, but vetoed by the
Governor on May 13, 2013. Tenn. Governor Haslam Vetoes Anti-Whistleblower
Bill, HUMANE SOC’Y (May 13, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/
press_releases/2013/05/gov-haslam-vetoes-tenn-ag-gag-bill-051313.html.
See
also S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.) (including both the reporting
requirement and the employment restriction).
30. See Statement of Opposition to Proposed “Ag-Gag” Laws From Broad
Spectrum of Interest Groups, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/
advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation/statementopposition (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
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eye.31 Reporting requirements serve the goals of Ag-Gag laws by
preventing activists from demonstrating a pattern of abuse and
repeated violations of standards.32 Therefore, these bills, by
decreasing transparency in the industry, are seen as not only a
barrier to animal protection efforts, but also as a threat to food
safety, journalism and newsgathering, worker’s rights, and the
right for the public to have access to information about their
food’s production and distribution.33
IV.

Background for the Constitutional Analysis of
the Ag-Gag Laws

In response to these laws, groups that support undercover
investigations are seeking means by which these laws may be
challenged.34 In July 2013, animal protection groups, activists,
and journalists filed a civil rights complaint challenging the
constitutionality of the Utah Ag-Gag law.35 Since Ag-Gag laws
seek to stifle access to, and exchange of, information, and utilize
means that criminalize the use of false speech or pretense, the
laws are vulnerable to freedom of speech challenges under the
To
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.36
determine the potential success of a First Amendment challenge,
it is essential to first determine which level of scrutiny a court
might apply in determining the constitutionality of the Ag-Gag
laws.
In a recent scholarly article, these laws were analyzed from
the framework of First Amendment protections for newsgathering

31. See id.
32. Alastair Bland, A Legal Twist in The Effort to Ban Cameras From
Livestock Plants, NPR (Apr. 11, 2013 4:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
thesalt/2013/04/10/176843210/a-legal-twist-in-the-effort-to-ban-cameras-fromlivestock-plants.
33. See ASPCA, supra note 30.
34. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 4.
35. See generally Complaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13CV-00679 (D. Utah July 22, 2013), ECF No. 2.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Jessalee Landfried, Note, Bound
& Gagged: Potential First Amendment Challenges to “Ag-Gag” Laws, 23 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 377 (2013) (summarizing potential First Amendment
challenges to Ag-Gag laws).
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to determine what level of scrutiny a court might use.37 As that
article concluded, there are a number of aspects of Ag-Gag laws
that support a finding that they should be subject to either
intermediate or strict scrutiny based on the impact that the laws
have on newsgathering.38 The laws can be understood to be
“specifically targeting people engaged in First Amendment
activities,” and a court may therefore use a heightened level of
scrutiny, perhaps even strict scrutiny.39 Further supporting the
use of strict scrutiny is the fact that Ag-Gag laws specifically
target the expressive activity of activists, and are written so that
they are not viewpoint neutral, and can act as prior restraints on
speech.40 The prohibitions on lying on employment applications
criminalize speech about identity and affiliations, also suggesting
that strict scrutiny should be used.41 The article further suggests
that there are other reasons that Ag-Gag laws should be subject
to at least heightened scrutiny, including because the laws will
have an impact on conduct “intimately related” to expression, and
will punish false statements without proof of harm.42
If, according to the article, Ag-Gag laws were subjected to a
strict scrutiny standard, a court would likely find the laws to be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in violation of the
requirement that the laws be narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest.43 Alternatively, it is also possible that the
laws would be found unconstitutional under intermediate
scrutiny, if a court finds the laws are intended to suppress
speech.44
Not explored in this analysis is the impact that the Supreme
Court’s support of First Amendment protections for false speech
in Alvarez might have on a court’s scrutiny of the Ag-Gag laws.
In particular, this analysis would apply to Ag-Gag laws that
criminalize gaining access to agricultural production facilities
37. See generally Lewis Bollard, Note, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of
Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10960 (2012).
38. See id. at 10971.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 10972-73.
41. Id. at 10974.
42. Id. at 10974-75.
43. Bollard, supra note 37, at 10976.
44. Id. at 10977.
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through misstatements, or by making misrepresentations on
employment applications. This is because, like a false statement
about having the Medal of Honor, a false statement on an
employee application is a form of speech protected by the First
Amendment. Material misrepresentations on an employment
application can be grounds for termination of employment;45
however, there is scant evidence of private businesses having
criminal protection against employees lying on job applications.46
V.

Impact of U.S. v. Alvarez on Challenges to
Ag-Gag Laws

In Alvarez, the Stolen Valor Act was found to be
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.47 The
Stolen Valor Act made it a crime to lie about receiving the
Congressional Medal of Honor.48
This was because the
government found the act of lying to be harmful to “the integrity
and purpose of the Medal.”49 Since the Stolen Valor Act targeted
the content of a certain type of speech—the act of lying about
having the medal–the law was categorized as a content-based
restriction on speech.50 The Plurality agreed that content-based
restrictions of speech should be subject to heightened scrutiny,
although three Justices relied on “exacting scrutiny,”51 while two
Justices relied on “intermediate scrutiny.”52
Despite this split in the applicable level of scrutiny, the Court
held that false statements can be subject to First Amendment
45. See, e.g., Duart v. FMC Wyo. Corp., 72 F.3d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1995)
(noting that material misrepresentations on a job application can be rightful
grounds for termination of employment); Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F.
Supp. 1246, 1255 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (discussing wrongful dismissal claim based
on misrepresentations made in a job application).
46. See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (c)(1) (2012) (making it a crime to lie to a government
agent, including material misstatements on a job application for a federal job)).
47. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c) (2012).
49. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543.
50. See id.; see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573
(2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.’” (citations omitted)).
51. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548.
52. Id. at 2551-52.
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protection.53 The Court recognized that there is an important
public interest in providing First Amendment protection to false
speech,54 and observed that giving the government the power to
punish false speech could lead to the government selectively
enforcing the law against certain groups, thereby chilling free
speech.55 Because of this, the Court rejected the idea that the
government may make laws that punish falsity and nothing
more.56
Recognizing the compelling government interest behind the
Stolen Valor Act, the Court found that the law was nevertheless
unconstitutional as a broad, content-based restriction that was
not the least burdensome means by which to accomplish its
goals.57 Emphasizing that restricting speech should be a last
resort when no other means can accomplish a compelling
government interest, the Court stated, “[t]he remedy for speech
that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in
a free society.”58
In reaching its decision, the Court discussed a limited field of
traditional areas where the government may create content-based
restrictions on speech.59 One of these areas is fraudulent speech,
53. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544-45. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on
public issues.” (citation omitted)).
54. Id. at 2553 (“False factual statements can serve useful human objectives.
. . . Moreover . . . the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement
can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby “chilling” a kind
of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”).
55. See id. The Court noted that
the pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse
motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or without
accompanying harm, provides a weapon to a government broadly
empowered to prosecute falsity without more. And those who are
unpopular may fear that the government will use that weapon
selectively, say by prosecuting a pacifist who supports his cause by
(falsely) claiming to have been a war hero, while ignoring members
of other political groups who might make similar false claims.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 2548-49.
58. Id. at 2550.
59. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted . . . only
when confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of
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described by the Court as, “[w]here false claims are made to effect
a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say
offers of employment . . . .”60 The Plurality did not provide
further clarification as to what exactly is required for false speech
to be categorized as “fraudulent speech.”
However, the concurrence of Justices Breyer and Kagan
sheds some light on what differentiates a statute targeting fraud.
The government argued that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §
1001, which makes it a crime to make false statements to a
government official, suggests that there are no constitutional
protections for false speech.61
The Justices rejected this
assertion, stating “[s]tatutes forbidding lying to a government
official (not under oath) are typically limited to circumstances
where a lie is likely to work particular and specific harm by
interfering with the functioning of a government department, and
those statutes also require a showing of materiality.”62 After
looking at other similar statutes, the Justices noted that in most
statutes criminalizing false statements, proof of specific harm
was required.63
The Supreme Court’s strong language regarding First
Amendment protection for false speech provides support for a
constitutional challenge to the aspects of the Ag-Gag laws
criminalizing misrepresentations on employment applications.
The analysis that the Court applied to the Stolen Valor Act
suggests that Ag-Gag laws could be subject to a heightened level
of First Amendment scrutiny despite their language aimed at
preventing false speech. However, if a court finds that the AgGag laws fall into the fraudulent speech exemption articulated in
Alvarez, this heightened scrutiny may not be applied. Therefore,
the remainder of this article will focus on, first, whether Ag-Gag
laws would be considered content-based restrictions on speech

60.
61.
62.
63.

expression] . . . [including] advocacy intended, and likely to incite
imminent lawless action, . . . obscenity, . . . defamation, . . . speech
integral to criminal conduct, . . . so-called ‘fighting words,’ . . . child
pornography, . . . fraud, . . . true threats, . . . and speech presenting
some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to
prevent . . . . (citations omitted).
Id. at 2547.
See id. at 2545.
Id. at 2554 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
Id.
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subject to strict scrutiny; and second, whether these laws would
be categorized as restricting fraudulent speech. Finally, the
article will analyze whether Ag-Gag laws would survive the type
of scrutiny applied in Alvarez.
A. Ag-Gag Laws Are Content-Based Restrictions
on Speech
The Ag-Gag laws passed in Utah and Iowa could be
understood to be content-based restrictions on speech. A law will
be considered content-based when “the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys.”64 The Stolen Valor Act was a restriction on the content
of speech, because it criminalized lying about having the Medal of
Honor.65 In this way, the content of speech being restricted, in
the case of Alvarez, was the ability for someone to give false
information about the Medal of Honor. Therefore, the Stolen
Valor Act was an expression by the government that it disagreed
with the content of speech when that speech was a lie about being
awarded the Medal of Honor. Thus, the Court found that the law
was a content-based restriction subject to a heightened level of
First Amendment scrutiny.66
The Ag-Gag laws in Utah and Iowa criminalize lying on an
employment application at an agricultural production facility.67
These laws restrict the content of speech given by a person when
he or she applies for employment at an agricultural production
facility. Through Ag-Gag laws, the government expresses its
disapproval with certain types of speech made in the context of an
employment application.
A conviction under these laws is
contingent on whether or not the statements made are false.
Therefore, the Ag-Gag laws restrict the content of speech by
punishing a person based on what sort of speech the person
makes. The Ag-Gag laws, like the Stolen Valor Act, are contentbased restrictions on speech because they aim to restrain the type
of speech allowed on an employment application.

64. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation
omitted).
65. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
66. See id. at 2548.
67. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c).
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The government’s contention in Alvarez, that the Stolen
Valor Act is similar to a federal statute prohibiting lying to a
government official, supports the conclusion that Ag-Gag laws are
content-based restrictions on speech.68 In defending the Stolen
Valor Act’s content-based restriction on speech, the government
asserted that the Court should treat the law similar to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, which criminalizes lying to a government official about
official matters.69 If the government asserted that the contentbased Stolen Valor Act should be upheld based on the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, it follows that 18 U.S.C. §
1001 must also be considered by courts to be a content-based
restriction. If a statute criminalizing lying to a government
official is considered a content-based restriction, then, naturally,
laws criminalizing lying on an employment application are also
content-based restrictions.
Like the Stolen Valor Act, the Ag-Gag laws criminalize
speech based on its falsity. Accordingly, since Ag-Gag laws target
the content of the speech on an employment application, they are
content-based restrictions on speech subject to strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment.
B. Ag-Gag Laws Should Not Be Considered Statutes
Targeting Fraud for the Purposes of Determining
the Standard for First Amendment Review
Even if a law clearly restricts content-based speech, there is a
list of certain types of speech that courts have ruled that the First
Amendment does not prevent the government from regulating.
These include obscenity, fraud, speech integral to criminal
conduct, and incitement.70 If a court were to find that Ag-Gag
laws are aimed at preventing fraud, the laws would be subject to
a lower standard of review.71 However, since the Ag-Gag laws
fail to demonstrate a causal link between the restricted speech
and the harm alleged to result from the speech, the laws cannot
be considered fraud statutes.

68.
69.
70.
71.

See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545-46.
Id.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551-52.
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The Exemption for Fraudulent Speech
Requires a Causal Link Between the
Restricted Speech and Harm Targeted
by the Statute

It is well established that a restriction on speech is not
considered a restriction on fraudulent speech merely by virtue of
it being labeled as such.72 In order to determine if a court would
categorize the Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag laws as restrictions on
fraudulent speech, it is necessary to see if the laws have the
elements necessary to be categorized as laws preventing fraud.
Typically, for a misrepresentation to give rise to actionable fraud,
it must be a misrepresentation or concealment of a fact that is
material, reasonably calculated to deceive, made with the intent
to deceive, and that succeeds in deceiving the victim, who suffers
an injury as a result.73
When misrepresentations are criminalized as fraud by a
statute, they do not require all of the elements of common law
fraud.74 It is undisputed that false speech can only be considered
fraudulent if it has the potential to cause some harm.75 Criminal
statutes imposing penalties for misrepresentations are created
with the understanding that the fraudulent speech, in the very
least, has the potential to cause some harm, as there would be no
need to criminalize speech that no one perceives to be harmful.76
The Supreme Court, in discussing fraudulent speech in
Alvarez, suggests that fraudulent speech requires more than the
mere potential to cause harm.
The Court recognized the
importance of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and understood
the harm that the government sought to prevent by punishing
those who misrepresented that they had received this honor.77

72. See Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 617 (2003).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
74. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 476 (2006) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Natali Wyson, Note, Defining Fraud as an Unprotected Category of
Speech: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Have Upheld the Stolen Valor Act in
United States v. Alvarez, 2012 BYU L. REV. 671, 682 (2012) (footnote omitted).
76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (criminalizing mail fraud); 15 U.S.C. §
78j (2012) (criminalizing manipulative and deceptive devices in commerce).
77. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct at 2549 (“The Government's interest in protecting
the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question.”).
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However, this potential for harm was not enough to compel the
Court that the Stolen Valor Act targeted fraud. Instead, the
Court asserted that “[t]here must be a direct causal link between
the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”78
This suggests that, for a statute to fall under the fraud
exception, there must also be a direct causal link between the
targeted false speech and the perceived harm. If this proximate
cause between the false speech and harm does not exist, then the
statute would not have the required “direct causal link” between
the restriction and harm that the statute seeks to prevent.
Therefore, it is likely that any fraud statute that would fall under
the exception to First Amendment protection would need to have
the same type of causal link between the misrepresentation and
the harm sought to redress as is needed in civil fraud actions.
The requirements for civil actionable fraud varies from state
to state, though all require “a knowing misrepresentation of a fact
by one party which induces another party to act or to fail to act,
which in the end, causes damage to the party relying upon the
misrepresentation.”79
For civil actions regarding fraud
perpetrated in the context of job applications, courts have
required the typical elements of common law fraud, and have
emphasized the need for the harm to be proximately caused by
the misrepresentation.80
The case of Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
provides a useful lens to view the issue of misrepresentation to
gain employment, as the action for fraud in that case was based
on a report of food handling violations at a grocery chain made by
undercover investigators.81
To access the information, the
investigators gained employment at the grocery chain by
misrepresenting information on their job applications.82 The
resulting report showed Food Lion’s employees engaging in
78. Id. at 2549 (citation omitted).
79. See, e.g., 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 12 (2013) (footnote omitted).
80. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir.
1999).
81. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 510.
82. See id. (“With the approval of their superiors, they proceeded to apply for
jobs with the grocery chain, submitting applications with false identities and
references and fictitious local addresses. Notably, the applications failed to
mention the reporters’ concurrent employment with ABC and otherwise
misrepresented their educational and employment experiences.”).
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unsanitary meat-handling practices, and caused Food Lion
substantial losses in profits, good will, and stock value.83 In a
civil suit, Food Lion sought recovery of “publication damages,” the
losses that occurred as a result of the public’s response to the
report created by the investigation.84 In addition, it sought
recovery of wages paid, and administrative costs incurred, from
hiring the investigators based on their misrepresentations.85
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina found that, since Food Lion made no claim of
defamation, there was no assertion that the report was false, and
therefore the misrepresentations made by the investigators were
not the proximate cause of the publication damages.86 Rather, it
was the mishandling of food that proximately caused the losses,
and the mishandling interrupted any causal chain of harm
created by the misrepresentations.87 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision on First Amendment grounds, but gave no indication
that it disagreed with the district court’s reasoning.88 Further,
the Fourth Circuit found that Food Lion could not recover for
administrative costs or lost wages, due to lack of proximate
cause.89
This requirement of proximate cause for recovery from a
misrepresentation is analyzed by courts on a state-by-state
basis.90 However, it is an established element of common law
83. See id. at 511.
84. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 959
(M.D.N.C. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
85. See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 511.
86. See Food Lion, Inc., 964 F. Supp. at 963 (noting that “tortious activities
may have enabled access to store areas in which the public was not allowed and
the consequent opportunity to film people, equipment and events from a
perspective not available to the ordinary shopper, but it was the food handling
practices themselves—not the method by which they were recorded or
published—which caused the loss of consumer confidence.”).
87. See id.
88. See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 522 (“We do not reach the matter of
proximate cause because an overriding (and settled) First Amendment principle
precludes the award of publication damages in this case, as ABC has argued to
the district court and to us.”).
89. See id. at 514 (finding that wages were paid for work well done).
90. See, e.g., Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.
2009) (analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on
Pennsylvania law); Shalaby v. Bernzomatic, 281 F.R.D. 565, 574 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
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fraud, and there is no evidence of a court rejecting the idea that
there must be a close causal link between the misrepresentation
and the harm asserted from fraud.91 Courts are hesitant to find
proximate cause when there are other intervening or underlying
factors more directly linked to the damages.92 Based on the
analysis in Alvarez, a fraud statute must have this causal link to
avoid heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
b.

Ag-Gag Laws Are Not Fraud Statutes
Because They Lack a Causal Link Between
the Misrepresentation and the Harm
Sought to Be Prevented

Based on common law requirements for recovery from fraud
and the Supreme Court’s requirement of a direct causal link, for a
law to be considered a restriction on fraudulent speech, there
must be a causal link between the misrepresentation targeted
and the harm the law intends to address. In order to assess
whether the provisions in Ag-Gag laws criminalizing employment
have this required link, the harm that the laws intend to prevent
must first be identified.
Neither Iowa’s nor Utah’s Ag-Gag law states within its text
the harm that each seeks to prevent.93 The statements of
supporters of each the law may illuminate the intent of the laws.
Unfortunately, these statements are not particularly unified or
well recorded. The following overview focuses on statements by
state representatives regarding Ag-Gag laws and two major non(analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on California law);
Dist. 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532
(D.N.J. 2011) (analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on
New Jersey law).
91. See, e.g., 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 271 (2014) (“To support an
action for fraud, the fraud or misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of
the damages upon which the action is based.” (footnote omitted)). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A Comment (a) (1977) (“In general, the
misrepresentation is a legal cause only of those pecuniary losses that are within
the foreseeable risk of harm that it creates.”).
92. See Sonfast Corp. v. York Int’l Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (M.D. Pa.
1994). But see Kelley Metal Trading Co. v. Al-Jon/United, Inc., 835 F. Supp.
1339, 1343 (D. Kan. 1993) (noting that, under Kansas law, proximate cause does
not mean the only cause, as long as but for the reliance, the damages would not
have occurred) (citation omitted).
93. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112.
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profits supporting Ag-Gag laws.
It will then analyze the
legitimacy of the stated goals of the Ag-Gag laws.
In regards to the Iowa Ag-Gag law, State Senator Joe Seng
stated that the law was intended to protect the investments of
livestock producers, and to prevent exposure to disease and other
problems that my arise from unauthorized access to agricultural
production facilities.94 The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation’s
President supported the law on the basis that it would help keep
farms safe by assuring transparency regarding the character of
workers.95 Iowa’s Governor Terry Branstad supported the bill as
a protection of property rights, and as a means to prevent illegal
and deceptive practices being used to disrupt agricultural
production facilities.96
In Utah, State Senator David Hinkins described the Ag-Gag
law as one intended to prevent trespass and espionage on the
operations, protect property rights, and protect the livestock
business from “the vegetarian people.”97
Utah State
Representative John Mathis voiced similar reasons for his
support, such as a desire to stop the groups investigating
agricultural production facilities from being able to use footage
from farms to aid their agenda.98
The non-profit Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA) touts AgGag bills as “farm protection legislation,” and supports them as a
response to protect farms from the impact of undercover
94. See Rod Boshart, Bill Creates ‘Agricultural Production Facility Fraud,’
QUAD CITY TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012 1:52 PM), http://qctimes.com/news/local/billcreates-agricultural-production-facility-fraud/article_df54ddd6-6245-11e1-b3710019bb2963f4.html.
95. See Laurie Johns, Iowa Farm Bureau Supports Revised HF 589 to Protect
Integrity and Safety of Family Farms, RIVER CITIES’ READER, (Mar. 6, 2012 8:12
AM),
http://www.rcreader.com/news-releases/-iowa-farm-bureau-supportsrevised-hf-589-to-protect-integrity-and-safety-of-family-farms-/.
96. See Mike Glover, Branstad Defends Signing Livestock Bill into Law,
HUTCHINSON NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012 9:00 AM), http://www.kansasagland.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6543:branstad-defends-signinglivestock-bill-into-law-&catid=42:regional-ag-news&Itemid=84.
97. See Majorie Cortez, Bill on Interfering With Agricultural Operations Gets
Preliminary Nod in Senate, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012 5:53 PM), http://
politicalnotebook.blogs.deseretnews.com/2012/03/06/bill-on-interfering-withagricultural-operations-gets-preliminary-nod-in-senate/.
98. See Josh Loftin, Filming on Farms Could Be Banned in Utah, FOOD MFG.
(Feb. 27, 2012 12:43 PM), http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/news/2012/02/
filming-farms-could-be-banned-utah.
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It is imperative that activists be held accountable for their
actions to undermine farmers, ranchers and meat processors
through use of videos depicting alleged mistreatment of animals
for the purposes of gaining media attention and fundraising–all
in an effort to drive their vegan agenda.100

The AAA further alleges that videos released from undercover
investigations are “highly edited” and “attempt to use emotional
images and scare tactics to discourage Americans from eating
meat, milk and eggs because they do not believe that we have
that right.”101 Based on these statements, it seems that this nonprofit supports Ag-Gag laws as a means to protect agribusiness
from the reputational harm that comes from the allegedly
misleading videos produced by undercover investigations.
Further, the AAA bases their support on the purported
disingenuous intent of animal protection groups, which the group
understands to be the end of all animal agriculture.
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has
been credited with the creation of the text of Ag-Gag laws.102
Spokesman Bill Meierling explained the intent of the laws
stating, “[a]t the end of the day it’s about personal property rights
or the individual right to privacy.”103 ALEC describes its goals
regarding animal agriculture as deterring “extremist attempts to
establish animal rights as a public policy objective,” and

99. See Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose Animal Cruelty, Should They
Be Targeted With “Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debate_after_activists_covertly_expose_
animal.
100. Alliance Applauds Introduction of Bill to Protect Farmers From
Undercover Extremists, ANIMAL AGRIC. ALLIANCE (Mar. 2, 2011), http://us1.
campaign-archive2.com/?u=69c4e87210c5554923516496c&id= d1dd7fe219.
101. Animal Agric. Alliance, Deceptive Videos Unfairly Attack Farmers,
FARMS.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.farms.com/farmspages/commentary/
detailedcommentary/tabid/192/default.aspx?newsid=36655.
102. See Will Potter, “Ag Gag” Bills and Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC,
GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/
blog/ag-gag-american-legislative-exchange-council/5947.
103. Associated Press, State Bills Seek End to Farm Animal Abuse Videos, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/17/state-billsseek-end-to-farm-animal-abuse-videos/# ixzz2Qn96AWvl.
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providing “protection of generally accepted agricultural and
management practices from public or private nuisance suits.”104
This suggests that ALEC supports Ag-Gag laws as a means to
prevent violations of privacy, as well as frivolous and damaging
suits against animal agricultural production facilities. Further,
the Ag-Gag laws are seen as a way to combat the perceived
damaging agenda promoted by undercover investigations by
animal rights groups.
These remarks do not provide a clear insight into precisely
what harm the Ag-Gag laws target. To summarize, the goals
behind the Ag-Gag laws that carry the most logical and factual
weight could be understood to protect property from trespass, and
privacy violations. The Ag-Gag laws also can be a means to
prevent any disruptions to the functioning of the facility as a
result of unauthorized access, and to protect the reputation of the
animal agricultural production industry as a whole. Further, the
statements by supporters suggest a desire to stifle efforts by
animal protection groups to promote their agendas.
There is no case law that supports the idea that gaining
access to a facility by misrepresenting information on an
employment application can sustain an action for trespass.105 It
is also well established that corporations, or other non-human
entities, have no right to personal privacy.106 Therefore, by
preventing misrepresentation on an employment application, the
laws cannot be understood to prevent trespass or violations of the
privacy of an agricultural facility.
There is limited information available on what specific
disruptions at agricultural production facilities the laws seek to
target. If the disruptions were understood to be the impact that
the eventual publications of recordings from the facility could
have on operations there, then the precedent of Food Lion, Inc.
would mean that this harm lacks proximate cause to the
misrepresentation.107 Thus, if the recordings accurately portray
activities at the facility, any public outcry, lost profits, or
governmental investigations would stem directly from the
104. ALEC Agriculture Principles, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Apr. 2011),
http://www.alec.org/model-legislation/alec-agriculture-principles/.
105. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 518.
106. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
107. See Food Lion, Inc., 964 F. Supp. at 962-63.
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activities taking place at the facility, not from the
misrepresentation of the employee on the employment
application.
If
employees
that
misrepresented
information
on
employment applications posed a risk to the day-to-day
functioning of the facility, this may be a more direct causal link.
However, there is limited evidence of this harm actually
occurring, and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act already
makes it a federal crime for someone to tamper with operations at
an agriculture production facility.108 In addition, courts might
find that the direct cause of the harm to a facility is disruptive
employee behavior rather than a misrepresentation on an
employment application.
Many of the remarks by supporters of the laws, suggest that
the main purpose of Ag-Gag laws is to prevent the investigative
reports that cause public outcry against agribusiness.109 Animal
protection groups that conduct undercover investigations promote
this same understanding of the Ag-Gag laws.110 If the harm that
Ag-Gag laws seek to prevent is the undercover investigations and
the impact of the release of records, then the restrictions on
misrepresentations on employment applications cannot be
classified as restricting fraudulent speech. Any losses to an
agricultural production facility from the publication of recordings
would be the direct result of the activities portrayed, not the
misrepresentation. If the recordings do not accurately portray
the activities at the facility, then there could be a cause for
defamation,111 but false portrayals of the facilities’ activities are
not what the Ag-Gag laws prohibit.
Even though they purport to target fraud, Ag-Gag laws fail to
have a direct link between the harm that the law intends to
prevent and the speech restricted. Without this link, it is
unlikely that a court would find that the laws meet the
requirements set out in Alvarez for restrictions on fraudulent
speech. As explained, in Alvarez, the Court recognized the
compelling government interest supporting the Stolen Valor Act
108. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012) (making it a federal crime to intentionally harm
the property of an animal enterprise).
109. See Cortez, supra note 97.
110. See HUMANE SOC’Y, supra note 20.
111. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 522.
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and the harm that the law sought to prevent, yet still found that
the harm and the restriction lacked a link direct enough to pass
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.112 In comparison, Ag-Gag
laws are based on attenuated, and often unclear, assertions of
harm.113 Under the Court’s analysis in Alvarez, the Ag-Gag laws
would not be categorized in the fraud exception to the protection
of false speech under the First Amendment.
c.

Ag-Gag Laws Would be Subject to a
Heightened Level of First Amendment
Scrutiny

The Supreme Court in Alvarez clearly stated that First
Amendment protections apply to false speech.114 The Court
further provided insight into the elements that a law must have
in order to be categorized as a restriction on fraudulent speech,
and therefore not be subject to a heightened level of First
Amendment scrutiny.115 Based on the criteria set forth in
Alvarez, and the principles of common law fraud, the provisions of
Iowa’s and Utah’s Ag-Gag laws targeting misrepresentation on
employment applications cannot be considered restrictions of
fraudulent speech.
Since the Ag-Gag laws would not be categorized as an
exception to First Amendment protections, a court should analyze
them under the framework set forth in Alvarez. If a court finds
that the Ag-Gag laws should be viewed as content-based
restrictions on free speech, then it should subject the laws to
heightened First Amendment scrutiny. In combination with the
heightened scrutiny argument based on newsgathering
protections, this provides strong support for courts using a
heightened
level
of
scrutiny
when
determining
the
constitutionality of Ag-Gag laws.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553.
Id. at 2547-48.
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C. Ag-Gag Laws Would Not Pass Scrutiny Under a
Heightened Level of Review
In Alvarez, once the Court found that the Stolen Valor Act
was a content-based restriction on speech, it was subjected to
“exacting scrutiny,” which functionally appears to be similar to
strict scrutiny.116 Because of this, the Court first looked at
whether the Stolen Valor Act had a compelling government
interest, and then whether the law was narrowly tailored to
accomplish that interest.117 When the Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag
laws are analyzed under this analysis, they do not pass a First
Amendment challenge.
a.

Ag-Gag Laws Do Not Serve a Compelling
State Interest

Based on what is known about the intent of Ag-Gag laws, it
does not appear that the laws serve a compelling state interest.
However, determining this is difficult absent a clear statement
from the states passing these laws regarding the motives behind
them.
In Alvarez, the Court recognized the compelling interest the
government had in ensuring people did not lie about having the
The Plurality opinion explained the
Medal of Honor.118
importance of the Medal and the sacrifice it represents.119
Further, the Court expressed an understanding that the
government had a compelling interest in protecting the sanctity
of such a great honor.120 The concurring opinion of Justices
Breyer and Kagan summarizes what the Court considered to be
substantial justification for a compelling governmental interest:
[The Stolen Valor Act] seeks to protect the interests of those who
have sacrificed their health and life for their country. The
statute serves this interest by seeking to preserve intact the
country’s recognition of that sacrifice in the form of military

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 2548.
Id. at 2548-51.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
Id.
Id. at 2549.
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honors. To permit those who have not earned those honors to
claim otherwise dilutes the value of the awards.121

The Justices recognized that the Stolen Valor Act was motivated
by the convincing purpose of preserving the sanctity of military
honors.
The compelling interest of the Stolen Valor Act stands in
stark contrast to the interests that Ag-Gag laws seek to promote.
The Ag-Gag laws’ provisions criminalizing misrepresentation is
one way the laws seek to reach their intended goal.122 In the case
of laws impeding freedom of speech, the burden is on the
government to justify the speech restriction.123 However, since
the states that have enacted Ag-Gag laws have provided little
explanation of their purpose, the state interest in passing Ag-Gag
laws must once again be divined from the statements of
supporters of these laws.
The analysis above suggests that the overall goal of the AgGag laws is to prevent information regarding the operation of
agricultural production facilities from being disseminated to the
public. Therefore, it seems that the governmental interest in
creating Ag-Gag laws is to prevent the public from being exposed
to information gathered in undercover investigations. Further,
most statements suggest that the laws are not aimed at
protecting the public, but are meant to shield agricultural
production facilities from the impact that this disclosure to the
public has on their businesses.124
Keeping truthful information from the public, even if it is
thought to protect them from harm, is not recognized as a
compelling governmental interest.125 For example, in Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, the Supreme Court rejected “a
fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful
information” as a justification for laws restricting freedom of
speech.126 Similarly, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court

121. Id. at 2555.
122. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2).
123. See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
124. See AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 104.
125. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670-71 (2011).
126. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
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noted that, while a governmental interest in protecting the public
is compelling, a law cannot be justified on the basis of the need to
protect the public from certain truthful information that the
government feels will be misused.127 Therefore, even if the public
was adversely impacted by the decisions it made based on
exposure to undercover investigations, a court would not find
restricting access to these undercover investigations to be
constitutional.
The rhetoric surrounding Ag-Gag laws suggests that they are
not created with the protection of the general public in mind.
Rather, they are a means to protect agribusiness from harms to
reputation and profit that result from the dissemination of
undercover investigation information.128 Insulating agricultural
production facilities from outside scrutiny is not a compelling
governmental interest, as evidenced by the longstanding support
of the laws for whistleblower protection.129 In light of the fact
that there seems to be no assertions of trade secrets by the
facilities in regard to the need for Ag-Gag laws, and because of
the impact that practices in agricultural operations can have on
public health, it seems contrary to the public interest to reduce
transparency in the agribusiness sector.130
Absent better justification by the government regarding the
need for Ag-Gag laws, it seems that unlike the Stolen Valor Act,
Ag-Gag laws do not serve a compelling government interest. This
is because there can be no compelling governmental interest in
preventing the dissemination of truthful, unprivileged
information to the public.
b.

Ag-Gag Laws Are Not Narrowly Tailored to
Accomplish the States’ Interests

Even if a court were to find that the Ag-Gag laws promote a
compelling state interest, Ag-Gag laws would not prevail under
the “narrowly tailored” prong of strict scrutiny. For a law

127. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670-71.
128. See Animal Agric. Alliance, supra note 101.
129. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13) (2012).
130. See, e.g., Sarah Damian, Beef Whistleblower Details Failure of USDA
Inspection System, FOOD INTEGRITY CAMPAIGN (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.
foodwhistleblower.org/blog/22/238.
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restricting speech to survive strict scrutiny, the law must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.131
Therefore, if less restrictive means exist to accomplish the same
ends, then the law cannot withstand strict scrutiny.
In Alvarez, the Court focused on two failures of the Stolen
Valor Act: (1) the lack of a direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and harm to be averted; and (2) the
government’s failure to demonstrate why the restriction was
actually necessary to achieve the desired results.132 First, the
Court saw no evidence that restricting speech about the Medal
actually promoted the stated interests of protecting the sanctity
of the Medal.133 Second, the Court found that the government
“has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not
suffice to achieve its interest.”134 The Court recognized that any
harm caused by the lie could easily be mitigated by truthful
speech, and found that the Stolen Valor Act was therefore not a
necessary restriction on speech.135 Since the Stolen Valor Act
failed to be narrowly tailored, it was thus found to be
unconstitutional.
The Ag-Gag laws of Iowa and Utah also fail this test. Even if
preventing undercover investigations and the dissemination of
information from the investigations are understood by a court to
be a compelling state interest, these laws are not narrowly
tailored to survive strict scrutiny. Evidence that the laws are not
the least restrictive means on speech to accomplish their goals
can be seen through other versions of these bills being proposed
in other states. Not all proposed Ag-Gag laws include a provision
criminalizing lying on an employment application.136 These bills
all have the same intent as the Ag-Gag laws in Utah and Iowa.137

131. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
132. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2550-51.
136. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013; A.B. 343, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.); L.B.
204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); H.R. 110, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H.);
H.B. 1191, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); S. 1248, 108th Gen. Assemb.
(Tenn. 2013).
137. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-offarm-cruelty-is-becoming-the-crime.html?_r=0.
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For example, bills requiring that recordings of animal cruelty be
reported within a certain period of time are understood as
attempts to prevent the information gathered during undercover
investigations from being disseminated directly to the public.138
Though these types of bills may give rise to their own set of
constitutional challenges,139 they more directly address the
perceived threat of the release of information from undercover
investigation.
The language in Alvarez also hints at an even less restrictive
means to prevent the harms that occur to agribusiness as a result
of the undercover investigation videos. In Alvarez, the Court
found that the government had not shown why counterspeech
was insufficient to combat the harms that the Stolen Valor Act
sought to address. In recognizing this, the Court declared: “The
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the
ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned
is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the
straightout lie, the simple truth.”140 Through this logic, the
Court strongly suggests that when an identified harm can be
combated by greater transparency and freedom of speech, then
that should be the means used.
This reasoning supports the idea that there might be more
effective ways to address the alleged harms to agribusiness that
result from undercover investigations. The main reason that
undercover investigations cause harm is the reaction that the
public, businesses, and regulatory agencies have to the
information gathered and disseminated.141
Following this
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Natalie Perrin-Smith Vance, Comment, My Brother’s Keeper?
The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Constitutional Analysis of Duty to Report
Statutes, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 135, 143-53 (1999) (outlining possible constitutional
challenges to a bill making it a duty to report certain crimes); see also Heidi
Hall, Humane Society Calls for Veto of ‘Ag Gag’ Bill, SHREVEPORT TIMES, (May 9,
2013),
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/DN/20130509/NEWS0201/
305090083/Humane-Society-calls-veto-Ag-Gag-bill (stating that the Tennessee
state attorney general labeled the bill “constitutionally suspect”).
140. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (citations omitted).
141. See Extremists Attempt To Mislead Public, ANIMAL AGRIC. ALLIANCE (Feb.
15, 2012), https://secure12.hostek.net/animalagalliance-org/current/home.cfm?
Section=20120215_Extremists&Category=Press_Releases
(alleging
that
undercover videos are used to mislead the public about commonly used farming
practices).
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reasoning, a possible solution is to compel animal agricultural
production facilities to address the content of the information
that is causing outcry, as well as legal and economic
repercussions.
Similarly, if the reports by undercover
investigators are indeed misleading, as the Supreme Court noted,
rather than passing laws restricting speech, counterspeech is the
most effective means to combat speech that is in fact misleading
or false. By targeting the dissemination of the information, the
states passing Ag-Gag bills made a clear choice to restrict
freedom of speech rather than to address the conditions in animal
agricultural
production
facilities
that
create
negative
repercussions to the facilities when brought to light.
The Ag-Gag laws are not narrowly tailored to address the
harm that the government seeks to address.
There are
alternative means by which to accomplish the goal of protecting
the reputation of agricultural production facilities that more
directly address the cause of the harm, and do not involve
restrictions on speech.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court case United States v. Alvarez provides an
important lens through which to analyze a First Amendment
challenge to Ag-Gag laws that criminalize lying on an
agricultural production facility’s employment application. Based
on the precedent of Alvarez, these laws would likely be classified
as content-based restrictions on speech, subject to heightened
First Amendment scrutiny.
While Alvarez outlines certain
restrictions on speech that are not subject to heightened scrutiny,
such as fraud statutes, it is clear that Ag-Gag laws are not in fact
statutes targeting fraud, and therefore do not fall within the
exceptions requiring a lesser level of scrutiny.
When the
heightened scrutiny analysis used by the Court in Alvarez is
applied to the Ag-Gag laws, there are strong arguments that the
laws lack a compelling government interest and are not narrowly
tailored. Therefore, it is likely that the Ag-Gag laws are
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
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